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Abstract Climate sensitivity and climate-carbon cycle feedbacks interact to determine how
global carbon and energy cycles will change in the future. While the science of these
connections is well documented, their economic implications are not well understood. Here
we examine the effect of climate change on the carbon cycle, the uncertainty in climate
outcomes inherent in any given policy target, and the economic implications. We examine
three policy scenarios—a no policy “Reference” (REF) scenario, and two policies that limit
total radiative forcing—with four climate sensitivities using a coupled integrated assessment
model. Like previous work, we find that, within a given scenario, there is a wide range of
temperature change and sea level rise depending on the realized climate sensitivity. We expand
on this previous work to show that temperature-related feedbacks on the carbon cycle result in
more mitigation required as climate sensitivity increases. Thus, achieving a particular radiative
forcing target becomes increasingly expensive as climate sensitivity increases.
1 Introduction
Human activities produce a variety of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including carbon dioxide
(CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O). These gases, and their non-anthropogenic
counterparts, accumulate in the atmosphere over time, altering the radiation balance and thus
temperature of the Earth. The change in temperature for a given change in radiative forcing (RF)
depends on climate sensitivity (CS). CS is a measure of the responsiveness of the Earth to changes
in RF. CS is the equilibrium global mean temperature (GMT) rise associated with a doubling of
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CO2-equivalent concentrations from pre-industrial levels (Hegerl and Zwiers 2007). Thus, if CS is
3 °C, then doubling the CO2 concentration will result in an increase in GMT rise of 3 °C.
1 As a
result, CS is a vital element in determining the emissions limit required to reach a prescribed
temperature goal (Edmonds and Smith 2006; Meinshausen et al. 2009). Specifically, a higher CS
will result in a higher GMT change for a given level of emissions.
In addition to a linkage between emissions and temperature, there is also an established
linkage between temperature and the carbon cycle (Cox et al. 2000; Friedlingstein et al. 2001,
2006; Randerson et al. 2009; Zeng et al. 2004). These studies find that warmer temperatures
accelerate the global carbon cycle (Bond-Lamberty and Thomson 2010), causing an increase
in microbial soil respiration. Additionally, while increases in CO2 concentrations lead to CO2
fertilization, or increased CO2 uptake, warmer temperatures may result in saturation of this
CO2 uptake by vegetation. The net effect is a decrease in terrestrial carbon uptake as
temperature rises, which results in higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations for the same level
of CO2 emissions. The combination of these effects creates a positive feedback. Increasing CS
results in higher temperatures for the same CO2 concentration levels. Higher temperatures
result in higher CO2 concentration levels for the same level of emissions, and higher concen-
tration levels lead to higher temperatures.
While the science of these connections is well documented, the economic implica-
tions of these phenomena are less established. Previous research has quantified the
amount of mitigation required to keep temperatures below 2 °C as CS increases
(Caldeira et al. 2003; Edmonds and Smith 2006) and under different assumptions
about ocean heat uptake (Johansson 2011). However, these articles did not explore the
role of CS on the carbon cycle. Other research has focused on carbon cycle uncer-
tainty and its implications for the cost of stabilizing CO2 concentrations (Smith and
Edmonds 2006), but this work did not link carbon cycle uncertainty to temperature. In
this article, we combine the two lines of research and examine the effect of climate
sensitivity on the carbon cycle from a mitigation perspective.
Many aspects of the earth system are uncertain, including climate sensitivity, CO2 fertili-
zation, climate-carbon cycle feedbacks, aerosol forcing, and ocean heat diffusion (see (Tanaka
et al. 2007) for a more complete discussion). In this analysis, we focus on one uncertainty,
climate sensitivity, and its effects on the carbon cycle and mitigation policy. The Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that the likely range for CS is between 2 °C and
4.5 °C, with the most likely estimate about 3 °C, and values above 4.5 °C still possible (Meehl
et al. 2007). Here, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on this parameter and find that achieving a
given RF target becomes increasingly expensive as CS increases due to climate feedbacks on
the carbon cycle. However, we also find that the uncertainty associated with CS causes the
scenarios to vary greatly with respect to the probability of more extreme changes in GMT.
While the more stringent policy scenario has only a small effect on the GMT, compared to the
more moderate policy target, at a CS of 3 °C, it greatly increases the likelihood of remaining
below 2 °C and not exceeding a GMT of 4 °C.
The next section describes the methodology used in this paper, including a brief description
of the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM). Section 3 describes the results of the REF
run. The effects of imposing a climate policy are detailed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
aspects related to risk and Section 6 concludes.
1 In this paper, when we refer to CS, we refer to equilibrium CS, or the change in equilibrium temperature
associated with a doubling of CO2 concentrations. The temperature rise numbers reported from the scenarios
results, however, are transient temperature rise. None of these scenarios have reached their equilibrium
temperature.
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2 Methodology
2.1 The GCAM model
The analysis undertaken in this paper uses the GCAM, Version 3.0 (Calvin et al. 2011; Clarke
et al. 2007; Kim et al. 2006). GCAM is a global integrated assessment model that couples
modules of the economy, energy system, agriculture system, land use, and the climate system
in an internally consistent fashion. The world is subdivided into 14 geopolitical regions in the
energy and economic systems and 151 regions in the agriculture and land-use systems. The
model operates from 2005 to 2095 in 5-year increments. GCAM is a market-equilibrium
model; that is, prices of all energy, agriculture, and forest products are adjusted until supply
and demand are equilibrated. GCAM is a dynamic-recursive model, that is, decision-makers
are myopic and future prices are not considered when choices are made.
The version of GCAM used for this analysis includes a representation of a water system with
both supply and demand modules. The water supply module is a gridded (0.5×0.5°) monthly
water balancemodel. Using griddedmonthly precipitation, temperature, andmaximum soil water
storage capacity (a function of land cover), it computes the amounts of evapotranspiration to the
atmosphere, runoff, and soil moisture (Hejazi et al., under review). The water demand module
includes six water demand components: agriculture (irrigation and livestock), primary and
secondary energy production, manufacturing and mining, and the municipal sector. Agricultural
water demand calculations are detailed, with derivations for 12 crop commodity classes at sub-
regional scales (Chaturvedi et al., 2013). Industrial water demands are calculated for a wide range
of energy technologies (Davies et al. 2013; Kyle et al. 2013), with the remainder of industrial
water use assigned to manufacturing. Municipal water use is a function of GDP per capita, water
price, and a technological change parameter (Hejazi et al., 2013).
GCAM computes emissions for 16 gases and short-lived species (CO2, CH4, N2O, F-gases,
SO2, BC, OC, NOx, CO, NMVOCs) from a variety of human activities. GCAM computes
GHG concentrations, RF, and climate-related variables with the Model for the Assessment of
Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC) (Wigley and Raper 1992). MAGICC is
a simple energy-balance model that includes coupled representations of gas-cycle and climate
models. MAGICC has been calibrated to reproduce the results of more complex models. It
allows the user to quickly analyze the effect of different projections of future anthropogenic
emissions profiles on the carbon cycle, RF, GMT rise, and global mean sea level rise (SLR).
These analysis in this paper is part of the Climate Change Impacts and Risk Analysis
(CIRA) project (Waldhoff et al. 2013, this issue), a project aiming to quantify climate change
impacts within the United States. To ensure consistency across scenarios within the CIRA
project, we have calibrated GCAM’s regional GDP and population to MIT’s EPPA model
(Paltsev et al. 2013, this issue), described further in the Supplementary Material (SM).
2.2 Scenarios
The CIRA project combines three policy assumptions (No action (REF), Not-to-
Exceed 4.5 W/m2 (POL4.5), Not-to-Exceed 3.7 W/m2 (POL3.7)) with four CS as-
sumptions (2 °C, 3 °C, 4.5 °C, 6 °C), resulting in 12 core scenarios (see (Waldhoff
et al. 2013, this issue), for more details). For the REF scenarios, we only modify the
CS parameter in the MAGICC component of GCAM. Thus, the four versions of the
REF scenario have identical energy systems, agricultural systems, water demand, and
emissions. They differ only in their GHG concentrations, RF, climate-related variables,
and water supply.
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For the policy scenarios, we limit RF to its prescribed level by imposing a carbon price on
all emissions, regardless of the source. Specifically, this carbon price applies not only to fossil
fuel and industrial emissions, but also to land-use change emissions (see (Wise et al. 2009) for
more information). We assume that all regions implement this carbon price beginning in 2015.
The time-profile of the price path is chosen to reach the RF target in the most cost-effective
manner. As a result, the price rises at the rate of interest until the target is reached. After that
time, the carbon price is adjusted in each period to ensure that the target is not exceeded
(Calvin et al. 2009). We compute carbon price paths for each of the four climate sensitivities
and two RF targets. When varying the climate sensitivity, it is important to note that we adjust
emissions to ensure the climate target is met, unlike the approach taken in the REF scenarios
where emissions were held constant and climate responded.
3 Business as usual scenario
3.1 3 °C CS results
The REF assesses the evolution of the economy, energy, agriculture, and climate system absent
any climate policy. In such a world, future changes in energy, agricultural, land, and water
demand are due to assumptions about socioeconomic conditions (Figure SM1), resource
exhaustion, and technological progress. Global primary energy consumption rises in the
REF Scenario, and the world remains dependent on fossil fuels to meet its energy needs
(Fig. 1a). In the USA, primary energy consumption rises in the first half of the century and
then stabilizes in the second half of the century (Fig. 1b), as increases in technological
efficiency offset the increases in energy services demanded by a growing population. Like
the world as a whole, the USA continues to rely heavily on fossil fuels throughout the century.2
Rising populations and increases in wealth result in greater demand for food over the course of
the coming century, as GCAM assumes that people will shift to a more meat-intensive diet as
incomes grow. These two effects, absent any other changes, would lead to an increase in land
devoted to crop and pasture. However, the increases in agricultural productivity that are assumed in
GCAM as a result of more mechanized agricultural production and future crop breeding efforts
offset the increase in crop and pasture lands. The net effect is that cropland grows slightly between
now and 2050 before declining (Fig. 1c). Pastureland remains virtually constant at a global level
throughout the century. In the USA (Fig. 1d), land used for the production of food and fiber grows
slightly in the near-term before stabilizing. Pastureland declines steadily, despite increases in
animal production, to accommodate increasing bioenergy production.
On the water supply side, the amount of total runoff is projected to increase by about 12–13 %
both globally and in the USA by 2095 (Figure SM2). This change is attributed to the wet future
climate associated with the IGSM-CAMmodel (Paltsev et al. 2013, this issue). Rising populations,
higher demands, and technological shifts attribute to mixed results in total water demands. Total
irrigation water demand for crops approximately doubles in the USA and triples in globally by
2095. These increases are due to the expansion of bioenergy and crop production tomeet increasing
demands. The non-irrigation sectors exhibit a similar trend of doubling globally by 2095 due to
2 Note that there is the discontinuity in energy use, both globally and in the USA, in 2095. This discontinuity is a
result of the exhaustion of conventional oil resources. To meet the continued demand for liquid fuels, the
production of unconventional oil and coal-to-liquids increases in 2095. These liquid fuels are more energy and
carbon-intensive than conventional oil, resulting in increased energy consumption (Fig. 1a, b) and increased CO2
emissions (Fig. 2a, b).
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increases in population, income, electricity and energy demand, especially in the developing world.
In theUSA, however, non-irrigationwater demand decreases by about 40% by 2095, primarily due
to diminishing thermoelectric cooling water demand. This decrease is driven by shifts away from
once-through cooling to more efficient cooling technologies. Therefore, under the REF, water
demands are projected to increase by about 150 % globally, and to stay roughly the same in the
USA by 2095.
Because of the continued reliance on fossil fuels, both global and U.S. total anthropogenic
CO2 emissions are dominated by energy-system emissions (Fig. 2a, b). Global CO2 emissions
rise steadily throughout the century from ~30 GtCO2/yr in 2005 (cf. (Le Quere et al. 2009)) to
~90 GtCO2/yr in 2095. In the USA, CO2 emissions grow between 2005 and 2050 before
roughly stabilizing. Land-use change (LUC) CO2 emissions grow modestly in the USA and
decline slightly at the global level. However, in both cases, LUC emissions are a very minor
component of total anthropogenic CO2 emissions.
The increase in CO2 emissions in the REF_CS3.0 Scenario results in a rise in CO2
concentrations from 380 ppmv in 2005 to 883 ppmv in 2095. RF rises from 1.6 W/m2 in
2005 to 7.2 W/m2 in 2095 (Fig. 2c). This leads to an increase in GMT of 3.9 °C above
preindustrial in 2095 (Fig. 2d). Global SLR increases by 47 cm by 2095.
3.2 The effect of CS on the carbon cycle
Given the design of the REF scenario, varying the CS does not affect energy, agricultural, land
use, or emissions (Fig. 3a). However, GMT increases with CS at a given level of RF. This
increase in GMT in turn affects the carbon cycle. In particular, we observe a slight increase in
ocean carbon uptake as the CS rises (Fig. 3b). However, this increased uptake is more than
offset by a decline in terrestrial carbon uptake.3 Between climate sensitivities of 4.5 °C to 6 °C
the terrestrial system switches from a sink to a source of carbon. This decline in carbon uptake
leads to a pronounced increase in the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. In 2095, CO2
concentration levels range from 825 ppmv to 890 ppmv depending on CS.
Thus, changing CS creates a positive feedback loop, in which higher temperatures lead to more
CO2 residing in the atmosphere, which results in different RF levels for the same emissions level
(Fig. 2c) and even higher temperatures. GMT rise increases by a factor of two across the four REF
runs. Much of this difference is attributable to changes in CS; however, some fraction of this is due
to the temperature-carbon-cycle feedback.4 Even within a given emissions scenario, the uncertainty
over CS creates a wide range of plausible changes to GMT in 2095. SLR is very sensitive to
temperature increases, particularly because one cause of SLR is thermal expansion, so as RF
increases, temperatures rise, and sea level also rises. The MAGICC results show a range in 2095
SLR for the REF scenario from 37 cm to 69 cm between CS of 2 °C and 6 °C.
3 LUC emissions are computed by the agriculture and land-use component of GCAM. However, the net
terrestrial uptake is adjusted within MAGICC. This uptake accounts for CO2 fertilization and temperature-
related effects of the carbon cycle.
4 In a separate experiment, we turned off the climate-carbon cycle feedback in MAGICC and re-ran the REF with
CS of 3 °C and 6 °C. At CS of 3 °C and 6 °C, CO2 concentrations are only 775 ppmv in 2095, 70 ppmv and 115
ppmv less than the cases with climate feedbacks, respectively. In 2095 GMT rise is 0.25 °C and 0.5 °C higher
with feedbacks than without for climate sensitivities of 3 °C and 6 °C, respectively. These results are well within
the range found in literature; (Friedlingstein et al. 2006), for example, finds that including the climate feedback
results in an increase in CO2 concentrations between 20 and 200 ppmv and an increase in global mean
temperature of between 0.1 °C and 1.5 °C. In eight of the eleven models included in this study, this effect is
mainly attributed to changes in terrestrial carbon uptake.
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4 Policy results
4.1 CS of 3 °C
The imposition of a carbon price raises the costs of freely-emitting technologies in the energy
system, rendering lower carbon technologies more attractive. As a result, primary energy
consumption, both globally and in the USA, shifts towards nuclear, renewables, and CO2
capture and storage (CCS) technologies (Fig. 4a, b). In POL4.5, energy production from
freely-emitting fossil fuel technologies are reduced from a peak of more than 700 EJ/yr in 2050
to below their 2005 values in 2095, whereas they grow continuously through the century in the
REF scenario. In the USA, all coal is used in combination with CCS in 2095. Global nuclear
power production grows by a factor of 16 over the coming century, biomass consumption
increases by a factor of ten, and non-biomass renewables increase by a factor of eight between
2005 and 2095.
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Fig. 1 Primary energy consumption and land use in the REF
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In the terrestrial sphere, the imposition of a carbon price provides incentives for land-
owners to increase their terrestrial carbon stock. The increased demand for bioenergy in the
energy system results in increased prices of bioenergy, which in turn influence land cover
decisions. As a result of incentives to sequester carbon in the terrestrial system, global forest
cover increases by 25 % between now and 2095 (Fig. 4c) for the POL4.5 scenario. This
compares with a slight decrease (4 %) forest cover in the REF scenario. POL3.7 has a slightly
smaller increase in forests at 23 % due to the increased demand for biomass production needed
to meet the tighter RF target. Land devoted to the production of bioenergy accounts for 3 % of
global land and 9 % of land in the USA in 2095 (Fig. 4c, d) in the POL4.5 scenario, compared
with 2 % and 6 %, respectively, in the REF.
In terms of water, climate policy leads to a decrease in total runoff and an increase in water
demand both globally and in the USA (Fig. 5a–d). Although reduced temperatures lead to a
reduction in evaporation, and thus, an increase in runoff, this feedback is offset by the decrease
in precipitation leading to an overall decrease in total runoff as compared to the REF Scenario.
On the demand side, higher biomass production and electricity use result in higher water
demands than in the REF Scenario. Water stress (defined as the ratio of demand over supply)
in the USA and globally (Fig. 5e, f) is affected by these changes in supply and demand. Water
stress globally increases from about 10 to 22–28 % in 2095. This may pose formidable water
stress challenges in the coming decades. In the USA, however, this ratio stays roughly around
17 % throughout the century.
The carbon price required to limit RF to 4.5 W/m2 rises exponentially between
2015 and 2095 (Fig. 6a). In the POL4.5 scenario, the price starts at $6/tCO2 in 2015
and reaches $195/tCO2 in 2095.
5 Total anthropogenic CO2 emissions decrease rapidly
in the initial period, before rising again (Fig. 6b). Emissions then peak in 2050 at
nearly 50 GtCO2/yr before declining to less than one-third of their 2005 levels. The
initial decline is due to the rapid expansion of forest cover globally (Fig. 4c) as a
result of incentives to increase terrestrial carbon stocks. The potential for afforestation
saturates soon after the policy is implemented. Emissions reductions that occur after
that point are mostly due to mitigation efforts in the energy system.
With a CS of 3 °C, climate policy reduces GMT rise in 2095 from 3.9 °C in the REF
Scenario to 2.6 °C in the POL4.5 scenario and 2.2 °C in the POL3.7 scenario. SLR in 2095 is
reduced from 47 cm in the REF to 36 cm in the POL4.5 scenario and 32 cm in the POL3.7
scenario.
4.2 The effect of CS on mitigation
In the policy cases, we prescribe a target RF value and allow emissions, carbon prices, energy
use, water demand, and land cover to respond in order to meet the target. As described in
Section 3.2, due to the climate feedback on the carbon cycle, varying the CS results in changes
in these systems. However, unlike in the REF where we held emissions constant and observed
changes in the carbon cycle, in the mitigation scenarios we allow the model to adjust emissions
so that the climate target is met. As a result, we find that, to reach the same RF target with
higher climate sensitivities, lower anthropogenic CO2 emissions (Figs. 6b and 3c) and higher
carbon prices (Fig. 6a) are required.6
As in the REF, we see a decline in terrestrial carbon uptake as the CS increases (Fig. 3d).
The model responds to this reduction in uptake by increasing mitigation of anthropogenic
5 All prices are in 2005 USD.
6 Note that high carbon prices do not necessarily imply high economic costs (see Luderer et al. 2012).
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emissions (Fig. 3c) to maintain roughly constant atmospheric CO2 concentrations (Fig. 3d).
This requires additional effort as demonstrated by the change in carbon price.7 For both the
POL3.7 and POL4.5 RF targets, the carbon price is 20+% higher under a 6 °C CS than under a
2 °C CS in 2050 and ~50 % higher in 2095 (Fig. 6a).
The CIRA scenarios are designed to limit RF to prescribed levels with four different climate
sensitivities. As discussed above, GMT change depends not only on the RF target, but also on
the CS. The uncertainty around CS results in a wide range of GMTchange at a given RF level.
Thus, GMT rise could range from 1.9 °C to 4.0 °C in 2095 for a POL4.5 scenario (Fig. 6d) or
1.6 °C to 3.4 °C for the POL3.7 scenario.8
If instead we opted to constrain temperature rise to a specific level, the difference in
mitigation effort across climate sensitivities would be larger than in the RF constraint
scenarios. For example, limiting temperature rise to 2.6 °C (the 2095 warming level in a
POL4.5_CS3.0) under a 6 °C CS requires RF to kept below 2.6 W/m2. In order to meet such a
goal, global anthropogenic CO2 emissions would need to peak at 20GtCO2/yr in 2030, as
compared to a peak of 47GtCO2/yr in 2050 under a 3 °C CS. Such effort would require a
carbon price through 2080 that is more than four times higher than that of the POL4.5_CS3.0
scenario. This change in peak emissions is consistent with (Caldeira et al. 2003; Edmonds and
Smith 2006).9
In summary, the carbon price required to achieving a RF target increases with CS because
tighter emissions limits are required to meet the same RF goal. In addition, for a given RF
target, even when the emissions mitigation is adjusted for the level of CS, GMT will still
increase with CS, a result consistent with previous literature. Restricting emissions to specific
levels will not guarantee that a RF target will be met, nor does meeting a RF target guarantee a
specific GMT change.
5 Mitigating risk through mitigation
For a risk-averse society, a thorough understanding of the risks associated with different future
scenarios is essential to informed decision-making. This requires the evaluation of both the
potential to achieve the desired GMT change and the likelihood of more extreme changes in
the climate. Decisions that are made based on only the GMT change at the current “most
likely” CS will fail to capture society’s risk aversion to potentially catastrophic climate
change.10
7 In this article, we are using carbon price as an indicator of the cost of mitigation. The carbon price tracks most
cost metrics in an idealized policy environment, which we assume here. In the context of non-ideal policies, the
carbon price can become decoupled from the policy cost (see Bernstein et al. 2003 and Montgomery et al. 2003).
8 Note that GMT rise in 2005 differs across the four climate sensitivities. In this experiment, we have only altered
the CS parameters within MAGICC. In reality, several other parameters (e.g., aerosol indirect forcing) are
correlated with CS, and should be adjusted simultaneously in order to replicate the observational record. The
precise parameters and their values are uncertain, as is the observational record. Thus, for this paper, we have
only adjusted CS. We did conduct an additional set of experiments where we adjusted CS and several additional
parameters within MAGICC. These adjustments did not alter the findings reported in this paper. A more
complete description of this experiment and its results are included in the SM.
9 Note that this study uses a different target temperature and different climate sensitivities than the two previous
studies. Thus, direct comparisons are difficult.
10 The risks associated with climate change are dependent upon multiple uncertainties (see (Waldhoff et al. 2013,
this issue) for a detailed discussion on sources of uncertainty in estimating the impacts and damages from climate
change). This analysis examines the effects of uncertainty over global average temperature change only and the
authors acknowledge this limitation.
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The scenarios described in this paper show a significant level of uncertainty
surrounding the level of climate change that will be realized with any specific RF
or emissions reduction policy. When these three scenarios are analyzed at the current
IPCC estimate of the “most likely” CS of 3 °C (IPCC 2007), the global average
temperature changes in 2095 are 3.9 °C, 2.6 °C, and 2.2 °C, for the REF, POL4.5,
and POL3.7 scenarios, respectively.
However, Fig. 7 shows the cumulative density functions for GMT in 2095 for each
of the three scenarios and emphasizes the differences in the distribution of GMT
across emission scenarios. By applying a an approximation of the probability distri-
bution for climate sensitivity provided in (Roe and Baker 2007),11 we can examine
11 This is the distribution over climate sensitivity used by the U.S. Government as implemented in the 2010
Social Cost of Carbon exercise.
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Fig. 2 Emissions, radiative forcing, and global mean temperature rise in the reference
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the likelihood of staying below various temperature thresholds for each emissions
scenario (see (Waldhoff and Fawcett 2011) for more information). While the POL3.7
scenario has a most likely GMT change in 2095 only 0.4 °C less than the POL4.5
scenario, the probability of the GMT change remaining below 2 °C is more than two
times greater under the more stringent policy (39 % as compared to 17 %), while
under the REF scenario, there is essentially no chance of remaining below this target.
In addition, the probability of exceeding more extreme temperature thresholds, such as
4 °C or 5 °C is greatly reduced in the policy scenarios. For instance, there is a 45 %
chance of GMT change exceeding 4 °C in 2095 for the REF scenario. The likelihood
of this more extreme temperature change is 9 % and 3 % for the POL4.5 and POL3.7
Anthropogenic Emissions (REF) Carbon Uptake and CO2 Concentration (REF)

















































































































































































































Fig. 3 Cumulative emissions (2005-2095), cumulative carbon uptake (2005-2095), and 2095 CO2 concentra-
tions in the REF and POL4.5 scenarios
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scenarios, respectively. Further, the most extreme GMT change outcomes are virtually
eliminated with more stringent policy targets.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we examine future changes in the energy, agriculture, land, water, and
climate in three policy scenarios under four different climate sensitivities. We find that
without any climate action, anthropogenic emissions continue to rise throughout the
coming century. These increases cause GMT to rise between 3 °C and 6 °C from
Global Primary Energy Consumption USA Primary Energy Consumption
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Fig. 4 Primary energy consumption and land use in the POL4.5_CS3.0 scenario
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preindustrial by 2095, depending on CS. The imposition of a carbon price reduces
emissions substantially, resulting in a decrease the projected temperature rise from REF.
Specifically, 2095 GMT rise ranges from 2 °C to 4 °C, depending on the RF target
(3.7 W/m2 or 4.5 W/m2) and the CS. Importantly, climate policy increases the probability
of staying below a particular temperature threshold. The chance of keeping GMT below
2 °C increases from 0 % in the REF to 17 % in POL4.5 and 39 % in POL3.7.
Additionally, our results indicate that temperature rise affects the ability of the
terrestrial system to store carbon, leading to higher CO2 concentrations for the same
Fig. 5 Total water supply (runoff), water demand, and water stress in the REF_CS2.0, REF,_CS3.0,
REF_CS6.0, POL4.3_CS3.0, and POL3.7_CS3.0 scenarios
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emissions levels under higher climate sensitivities. When a climate policy is imposed,
we find that higher climate sensitivities require higher carbon prices to limit RF to the
same level due to this carbon cycle feedback. This effect places additional uncertainty
on outcomes when specifying a RF target (commonly defined in the literature). Such
a target renders both the cost of mitigation and the expected temperature outcome
uncertain, as both are dependent on the actual CS.
The analysis conducted in this paper focuses on one uncertainty within the earth
system. However, many other aspects of this system are uncertain, including CO2
fertilization, climate-carbon cycle feedbacks, aerosol forcing, and ocean heat diffusion.
By focusing only on uncertainty in the CS, we do not fully explore the interactions
among the carbon cycle, climate, and economy. Instead, we leave a more thorough
investigation of these interactions to future research.
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Fig. 6 CO2 prices, emissions, radiative forcing, and temperature rise in the POL3.7 and POL4.5 scenarios
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